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2008 LAW REVIEW SYMPOSIUM: 
CORPORATIONS AND THEIR 
COMMUNITIES 
INTRODUCTION: CORPORATIONS AND 
THEIR COMMUNITIES 
Robert N Strassfeldt 
For a few years during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
Mahoning Valley in Northeast Ohio was at the front line of debates 
about the obligations, if any, that corporations owed to their 
communities. During those years owners of three of the Valley's 
largest steel plants ceased production and shut their doors. The 
decisions to shut down resulted in approximately 10,000 lost jobs and 
devastated the economies and social fabric ofYoungstown, Ohio, and 
its neighboring communities.1 The struggle to keep the steel plants 
from closing took piace in many venues. Eventually, as is so often 
true, the battle ended up in the courts. 
Briefly during that battle, Judge Thomas Lambros considered the 
possibility in United Steel Workers of America, Local No. 1330 v. 
U.S. Steel Corp. 2 that the U.S. Steel Corporation had obligations to 
stakeholders beyond its shareholders and those persons or entities to 
t Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
1 For a history of the shutdowns, see generally STAUGHTON LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST 
SHUTDOWNS: YOUNGSTOWN'S STEEL MILL CLOSINGS (1983). For the number of affected 
employees, see id. at 6. 
2 492 F. Supp. I (N.D. Ohio), affd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 631 F.2d 1264 
(6th Cir. 1980) 
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which it had bound itself by contract. Through his musings on the 
topic, he invited the litigants to consider whether the long relationship 
between the Mahoning Valley communities and the steel companies 
had given rise to a property right held by those communities and the 
steel workers who lived there that might limit the rights of U.S. Steel 
to close shop.3 
In the end Judge Lambros ruled that the steel workers had neither a 
contractual right nor a property right that might impede U.S. Steel's 
decision to close the plants.4 Such a property right would be a judicial 
invention with no basis either in statute or in prior common law, 
Judge Lambros concluded. He believed the court was unable to create 
such a right from whole cloth.5 
In the Mahoning Valley, the steel companies were typically 
viewed as the villain (or at least a villain, since fault was assigned 
to others, as well) in the story. Yet under another vision 
of a corporation's responsibility, the steel companies behaved 
appropriately by focusing on the best interests of their shareholders 
without regard for the impact of their decisions on the Mahoning 
Valley communities. Ten years before the Local No. 1330 decision, 
economist Milton Friedman argued that the only social responsibility 
of corporate managers was to further the goals (typically making 
money) of their employers: the shareholders. Any expenditure of 
corporate resources to fulfill a manager's sense of "social 
responsibility" that did not ultimately serve the goal of more profits, 
by, for example, generating good-will or attracting better workers to a 
particular community, misspent shareholders' money and was the 
height of irresponsibility.6 
The argument over how to characterize the corporation and 
describe its obligations will doubtless continue for as long as we have 
corporations. Both its friends and its critics focus on the corporation's 
power, whether as a generator of economic grov;.rth and wealth or as a 
careless wrecker of the people and things around it, in the singular 
pursuit of profit. The New York Court of Appeals struck a typically 
positive tone in calling them, "great engines for the promotion of the 
public convenience, and for the development of public wealth."7 
3 Id at 9-LO; LYND, supra note 1 at 162--67. For another interesting discussion of the 
case, see Joseph William Singer, Persuasion, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2442 (1989). 
4 Local No. 1330, 492 F. Supp. at 11. 
s Id at 10. 
6 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at 17. 
7 Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 366 (N.Y. 1888). The court went on to note, however, 
that a corporation that acted outside of their charters or sought to monopolize their trade became 
a "public menace." Id. 
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Nicholas Murray Butler, the President of Columbia University 
rhapsodized about the corporation in saying that: '"I weigh my words 
when I say that in my judgment the limited liability corporation is the 
greatest single discovery of modem times. . . . Even steam and 
electricity are far less important than the limited liability corporation, 
and they would be reduced to comparative impotence without it. "'8 
Others have been less enthusiastic. Justice Joseph P. Bradley is 
purported to have described corporations as "'Modem Shylocks and 
Railroad Smashers."'9 Professor Joel Bakan describes them as a 
"psychopathic creature."10 Justice Louis Brandeis, noting the growing 
wealth and power of corporations, described them as a "Frankenstein 
monster."11 Professor Lawrence E. Mitchell compares modem 
corporations to the monster-like creature of Jewish folklore, the 
Golem, which unstoppably follows the orders of its creator, no matter 
how destructive. 12 Finally, in its 2001 release, 1600 Transylvania 
Avenue, the San Francisco Mime Troupe, a radical theatrical group, 
also drew on horror film and literature imagery and likened the 
corporation to a vampire, given immortal personality by the Santa 
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. 13 decision and living 
on the blood of its victims. 14 
This Symposium is intended to broaden the discussion of the 
relationship between corporations and their communities. The first 
panel focuses on the continuing debate regarding stakeholder theory: 
the idea that corporate law defines the obligations of corporate 
managers too narrowly to the detriment of other stakeholders in the 
8 JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF.THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 9 (1970) (quoting 1911 remarks by Nicholas 
Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, quoted in Bernard F. Cataldo, Limited 
Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
473, 473 (1953) (citation omitted)) (omission in original). Butler originally made tlris comment 
in November 1911 in an address to the I43rd Annual Banquet of the Chamber of Commerce of 
the State of New York. WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS§ 21, at 43 (1917). 
9 ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920, at 81 (1967) (quoting Justice 
Joseph P. Bradley). 
IO JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND 
POWER 60 (2005). Bakan asked Dr. Robert Hare, a psychologist with expertise in 
psychopathy, to diagnose the corporation. Hare concluded that corporations demonstrate most 
standard psychopatlric traits. !d. at 56-57. 
II Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 564-67 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in 
part). Justice Brandeis was borrowing the phrase from a book by 1. Maurice Wormser, 
FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED (1931). 
12 LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST 
EXPORT 46-47 (2001). The folkloric Golem, by contrast, could be stopped by its creator. 
13 Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). 
14 SAN FRANCISCO MIME TROUPE, Legal People, on !600 TRANSYLVANIA A VENUE (BMI 
2001). 
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corporation. The relationship between corporations and their 
communities raises other questions, as well. What may a community 
do to attract a corporation to relocate in that community or to induce a 
corporation to resist the temptation to relocate elsewhere? Our second 
panel examines these questions. Finally, what may a community do 
when it regards a corporation as a bad neighbor? In some cases, 
communities have gone so far as to attempt to prohibit certain big box 
stores, often, but not exclusively, Wal-Mart, from opening a store in 
their location. More typically, they have sought to limit the behavior 
of such corporations in a variety of ways ranging from aesthetics and 
environmental impact to labor practices. Our third panel examines the 
limits of a community's ability to restrict their corporate neighbors in 
those ways. 
In a keynote address, Professor Joseph Singer identifies two 
assumptions that underlie the theory that limits corporate 
responsibility to the well-being of shareholders. 15 First, corporations 
are constrained only by existing statutes and regulations in their 
pursuit of wealth. Second, whether or not cuiTent regulatory restraints 
are adequate to protect the public good and stakeholders other than 
shareholders does not matter because the market will coiTect for the 
law's imperfections. In support of a theory of corporate responsibility 
that couples wealth production with conformance "with minimum 
standards compatible with the contours of a free and democratic 
society," Professor Singer argues that both of those assumptions are 
wrong. 16 
He counters the first assumption, that only statute and regulation 
limit the responsibility of corporations to pursue the production of 
wealth single mindedly for their shareholders by reference to the 
"other-regarding obligations" of tort, contract, and property law that 
have long curbed the appetite to do all that the law does not expressly 
prohibit in the marketplace. 17 Professor Singer more quickly 
dispenses with the second assumption as "demonstrably incoiTect."18 
Events have shown, he argues, that the market alone has not 
adequately protected other stakeholders (or, for that matter, defrauded 
shareholders), safeguarded the environment, or fostered equality of 
opportunity and outcome. 19 
15 Joseph William Singer, Corporate Responsibility in a Free and Democratic Society, 58 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1031 (2008). 
16 !d. at 1034. 
17 !d. at 1035-38. 
1s !d. at 1040. 
19 !d. at 1040-41. 
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The first set of articles focus on stakeholder theory. The authors 
engage the ongoing public and academic debate and each other 
regarding the desirability of changing corporate governance rules to 
give greater say to a broad array of stakeholders. 
Professor Kent Greenfield argues for a revised approach to 
corporate governance that would give a voice to such stakeholders as 
employees, creditors, and communities.2° Characterizing these 
stakeholders as "investors" in a corporation, Professor Greenfield 
argues that neither current corporate law nor market mechanisms 
adequately protect their interests.21 As a result, he argues, 
corporations contribute to growing disparities in wealth and increased 
rates ofpoverty.22 
In response to critiques of stakeholder theory, and in dialogue with 
his other panelists, Professor Greenfield argues that the contention 
that shareholder primacy is justified by their status as owners of the 
corporation presupposes its conclusion in its characterization of 
shareholders. Nor is he persuaded by the argument that as the primary 
residual claimants on the assets of the corporation, shareholders are 
best situated to safeguard the well-being of the corporation. Rather, 
he argues, shareholder primacy encourages managers to take greater 
risks than other stakeholders, most notably employees, might prefer. 
Because of limited liability and the likelihood that any shareholder 
holds stock in many companies, shareholders will be risk-preferers, 
While this might lead to greater firm profits, it also exposes the 
corporation to greater risk of failure, with all of its attendant social 
costs.23 Finally, he contests the arguments that changes in corporate 
governance rules are either unnecessary or counterproductive because 
employees and others who deal with the corporation can protect 
themselves contractually or by encouraging legislators to constrain 
corporations with tougher labor or environmentallaws.24 
As Professor Timothy Glynn notes, "[w]ho makes corporate law 
matters."25 He therefore mostly turns his attention away from the 
substantive law of corporate governance to how that law is produced. 
He finds that the law gives corporate managers control over the 
production of corporate law. This significantly shapes corporate law 
to the benefit of managers and to the detriment of other stakeholders. 
2o Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043 
(2008). 
21 Jd. at 1043. 
22 Jd at 1043-44. 
23 Jd at Part II. 
24 I d. at Parts III & IV. 
25 Timothy P. Glynn, Communities and Their C01porations: Towards a Stakeholder 
Conception of the Production of Corporate Law, 58 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2008). 
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Congress has chosen to leave much of the content of corporate law 
to the states. Consequently, a number of states that compete for 
corporate charters, especially Delaware, offer a corporate law that 
defers to managers and places the interests of managers and, 
secondarily, shareholders, ahead of other stakeholders. Delaware has 
triumphed in this competition, and its corporate law predominates. An 
important reason for its predominance is the internal affairs doctrine, 
a choice-of-law rule that says that one looks to the law of the state of 
incorporation to determine the rules governing a corporation's 
internal governance. Professor Glynn criticizes this doctrine as an 
impediment to adoption of more stakeholder-friendly laws in those 
states where groups other than shareholders may have the incentives 
and political power to refonn corporate governance law.26 
The vampire returns in Professor George Dent's response to 
Professors Greenfield and Glynn.27 Here, however, the undead is not 
the corporation, but stakeholder theory, which, according to Professor 
Dent, though given a proper internment in the past, seems to 
repeatedly return to haunt us. 28 Professor Dent responds broadly to 
the arguments for a greater stakeholder role in corporate governance, 
as well as to the specific arguments raised by Professors Greenfield 
and Glynn. 
Professor Dent disputes the arguments that a rule of shareholder 
primacy leads to an inefficient emphasis on short-term gains and to 
greater disregard for the harmful externalities that a corporation might 
impose on others. He notes that the empirical basis for such 
arguments is lacking and suggests that experience has shown that 
stakeholders are not clamoring for a seat at the board of directors' 
table. He further argues that in many instances other stakeholders are 
likely to be as happy to see the corporation impose negative 
externalities as would be shareholders. Moreover, there are more 
effective checks on corporate irresponsibility than the addition of a 
small number of representatives of other stakeholders on a 
corporation's board of directors where they might have difficulty 
monitoring corporate misconduct, or might be happy to indulge it if it 
does not adversely affect their constituencies. Corporate behavior is 
also constrained by the external legal regime, including such things as 
labor and occupational safety laws and environmental laws, by the 
corporation's desire to maintain a good reputation, and, at least in 
some instances, by the ability of other stakeholders to discipline a 
26 See id. at Part II. 
27 George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Govemance: A Bad Idea Getting Worse, 58 CASE W. 
REs. L. REV. 1107 (2008). 
28 !d. at 1107. 
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corporation by exit. Stakeholder theory, he argues, inadequately 
explains why these mechanisms will not suffice to constrain corporate 
misbehavior. 29 
Turning to Professor Glynn's recommendations, Professor Dent 
criticizes a number of Professor Glynn's suggestions regarding 
substantive corporate governance law.30 Professor Dent is less critical 
of Professor Glynn's primary argument that courts should abandon 
the internal affairs doctrine in favor of applying the law of the 
primary contact state. Nevertheless, he questions whether such a 
doctrinal switch would accomplish much, since he argues that states 
that now were able to exercise greater muscularity in the law of 
corporate governance would, instead, largely mimic the Delaware 
code.31 
In the end, Professor Dent argues that the problem is not too much 
solicitude for shareholders, but too little. He argues, as he has done 
more fully elsewhere/2 for a more robust regime of shareholder 
protection.33 
In a time of easy capital mobility and global economic 
competition, states and local communities struggle to attract and to 
retain firms. The second set of articles addresses such strategies as tax 
abatement and subsidies, including condemnation for private 
economic development that communities tum to either to exploit or to 
deter capital mobility. 
Professor Edward Zelinsky writes as a refonned promoter of tax 
inducements to corporations for economic development.34 Professor 
Zelinsky rejects two opposing views of tax incentives: that as tax cuts 
they are always good; or that as violations of the dormant Commerce 
Clause they are always unconstitutional. Instead, he occupies a 
middle ground that they pass constitutional muster and might 
sometimes be useful "signaling devices" to fmns.35 Nevertheless, he 
now views them with skepticism. While he regards tax competition 
among states and localities as beneficial, he believes that targeted tax 
incentives, by contrast, "are generally inefficient and unfair."36 
19 See id. at Part I. 
30 See id. at Part ll.B. 
31 !d. at Part V. 
32 George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fi.:r: in Sight, 31 J. CORP. 
L. 39 (2005). 
33 Dent, supra note 27, at Part VI. 
34 Edward Zelinsky, Ta:x Incentives for Economic Development: Personal (and 
Pessimistic) Reflections, 58 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1145 (2008). Professor Zelinsky promoted 
targeted tax incentives not only in academic debate, but also in his capacity as a New Haven city 
officiai.Jd. at 1145--46. 
35 !d. at Part I. 
" !d. at 1147. 
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The inefficiency of targeted tax inducements flows from a number 
of problems that Professor Zelinsky analyzes, including the 
asymmetry of knowledge about corporations' real preferences, which 
enhances their ability to bluff, and the short time horizons of 
politicians, who may opt for immediate gains that are costly long into 
the future. The unfairness obviously results from the uneven 
distribution of tax burden, which, in tum, will lead to clamoring from 
other corporations for similarly favorable treatment.37 Given the 
incentives that Professor Zelinsky identifies to give tax abatements, 
and the collective action problem-that each local community must 
fear that even if their neighbors would jointly agree not to compete 
through tax incentives, some community, somewhere, would-he 
sees little hope for self-discipline as a check on continuing reliance on 
tax incentives.38 He concludes by suggesting the possibility that 
Congress and state legislatures might impose such discipline from 
above. His skepticism, however, reaches this solution, as well.39 
Professor Morgan Holcomb and Nicholas Smith focus not on the 
strengths or weaknesses of targeted tax incentives, but on the perils of 
litigating their legality.40 Plaintiffs in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. 
Cuno41 learned how hard it is to litigate this issue when the United 
States Supreme Court rejected their dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine challenge to Ohio tax incentive legislation on standing 
grounds, thereby never reaching the merits. The Court held that the 
challengers to the Ohio tax incentive system lacked standing either 
under basic standing doctrine or as state taxpayers.42 
In the wake of Cuno, opponents of tax incentive systems have 
turned to state courts and relied, primarily, on state c_onstitutional 
grounds. Professor Holcomb and Smith examine the fate of such 
37 I d. at Part II. 
Js I d. at Part III. 
'
9 Id. at 1154. 
40 Morgan L. Holcomb & Nicholas Allen Smith, The Post-Cuno Litigation Landscape, 58 
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1157 (2008). 
41 547 U.S. 332 (2006). 
42 Regarding traditional standing doctrine, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs' 
assertions of injury in fact, causation, and redressabiiity were aii too speculative to sustain 
standing. !d. at 342-46. Regarding taxpayer standing, the Court reaffirmed its position that 
assertions of taxpayer standing against a state would be analyzed under the same narrow rules 
that apply to assertions of taxpayer standing against the federal government. !d. That doctrine, 
which saw brief light in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), was significantly circumscribed in 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464 (1982). Indeed, while the Court refused to ovenule Flast in its most recent 
encounter with taxpayer standing, Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 
587 (2007), there is reason to believe that nothing really remains of taxpayer standing, or that, at 
any rate, trying to get into federal court on the basis of taxpayer standing in a claim against the 
federal government or a state is much like trying to pass a camel through the eye of a needle. 
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challenges in Minnesota and North Carolina state courts, where 
claims have, again, mostly crashed on the rocks of standing, though 
there have been adverse merit rulings on some claims that survived 
standing challenges. They criticize the application of state standing 
doctrine in these cases as too stringently applied.43 
Professor Ilya Somin examines the susceptibility of private 
economic development takings to capture by rent-seeking special 
interest groups and the failure of most post-Kelo v. City of New 
London44 legislation to deal effectively with the rent-seeking 
problem.45 Both problems, he argues, stem in significant part from the 
deliberate (and rational) ignorance of the electorate regarding the 
intricacies of economic development takings.46 
Given the broad reach of "economic development," the 
opportunities for rent-seeking in takings on behalf of private owners 
for economic development purposes are plentiful. Voters and the 
political process are inadequate monitors of this tendency because the 
costs of determining the benefit of a taking are high while the value of 
such information to the individual voter is low. Information costs are 
high because these plans are often complex and any economic benefit 
occurs over a long time horizon. The value of such information, a 
collective good, on the other hand, is low to any individual voter, who 
recognizes that his or her potentially disciplining vote will have 
limited impact or personal benefit. 
For the same reason, the prospect for much effective post-Ke/a 
legislation that would limit economic takings abuse is slim. While 
polls indicate that there was widespread hostility to Kelo, they also 
demonstrate that people are unaware of and uninterested in the details 
(and typically even the existence) of anti-Kelo legislation for the same 
reasons that they are not active monitors of economic development 
takings. Professor Somin suggests that, .consequently, most state 
legislatures have contented themselves with enacting ineffective 
"position-taking" legislation that satisfies their constituents' desire for 
a response, while causing little offense to powerful developer and 
other business groups, who are satisfied with the toothlessness of the 
43 As Holcomb and Smith show in Minnesota and North Carolina, post-Cuno challenges 
initially raised the dormant Co=erce Clause Doctrine claim. Holcomb & Smith, supra note 
40, at Part N. In a subsequent round of litigation in both states, the plaintiffs abandoned the 
dormant Commerce Clause issue. Presumably, they did so in order to render their suits 
unremovable to federal court in the hope of encountering more favorable standing doctrine 
based on state law. !d. at Part V. 
44 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
45 Ilya Somin, The Politics of Economic Development Takings, 58 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 
1185 (2008). 
46 !d. at 1185-86, Part 1. 
1026• CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:4 
legislative response.47 He suggests that while a small number of states 
have responded more aggressively, the most effective responses to 
Kelo will have to come from the courts.48 
Attorney Steven Kaufman considers the obstacles to regional 
economic development in the aftermath of Kelo.49 Kaufman argues 
that many regional economies, especially those in metropolitan areas 
whose economies relied in the past on heavy industry, face economic 
obsolescence if they are unable to plan and implement competitive 
regional strategies for economic development.50 
Kaufman contends that critical to regional economic success is 
elimination of intra-regional community competition. Also critical is 
the availability of erllinent domain for the purpose of economic 
development whether by government entities or private developers. 
Community competition is a continuing challenge that often vexes 
regional solutions. In the aftermath of Kelo many state legislatures 
and courts have curtailed the ability of communities to use eminent 
domain for economic development done by private developers, and 
Kaufman examines some examples of this backlash.51 
Kaufman calls for greater clarity in the law regarding the level 
of deference due to legislative decisions regarding economic 
development takings. He asks that the legislative and judicial reaction 
to Kelo not undermine the powerful tool of economic development 
takings, while focusing, instead, on greater protections against the 
abuse of legislative power in these matters. 52 
The final panel turned to the question of local regulation of 
corporations perceived to be bad or unwelcome neighbors. In the 
most extreme instances, communities have sometimes organized to 
bar big box stores, often Wal-Mart, from locating in their 
communities. Short of that, communities have wrestled with what sort 
of restrictions they may legally place on big box stores and other 
corporations whose presence they might perceive as a mixed blessing. 
Professor Patricia Salkin examines the variety of tools available to 
communities that seek to restrict "formula businesses" from locating 
within them, or to control the behavior of those businesses when they 
do establish a presence in a particular community. 53 Formula 
47 !d. at Part !!.8.2. 
48 !d. at 1197-98. 
49 Steven S. Kaufman, Regional Economies and the Constitutional Imperative of Eminent 
Domain, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1199 (2008). 
5° !d. at Part l. 
5 1 !d. at Part II. 
52 !d. at 1232. 
53 Patricia E. Salkin, Municipal Regulation of Formula Business: Creating and Protecting 
Communities, 58 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1251 (2008). 
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businesses are not only the prototypical big box stores, but all 
businesses, including restaurants, banks, hotels, and other retail 
stores, that through their business plans and contracts require 
uniformity in such features as decor, architecture, standardized 
products or service, and methods of operation. 
Communities may seek to restrict or regulate such enterprises for a 
variety of reasons, some legal and others legally problematic. 
Communities act out of a desire to retain community character and 
aesthetics, especially in unique communities that are dependent on the 
tourist trade. They may also act out of concern about various 
environmental impacts including storm water runoff from large 
parking lots, light pollution, increased traffic, and urban sprawl. Some 
formula businesses have prompted community reactions based on 
social equity concerns, generally related to an enterprise's labor 
practices, either domestically or internationally, or environmental 
practices. Finally, and importantly, communities act out of concern 
about economic impact, both on the community as a whole, and on 
local businesses that may find it difficult to compete with large chain 
stores. 
Professor Salkin surveys and analyzes a large array of tools 
available to communities seeking ·to restrict or restrain formula 
businesses. Many of these are traditional and newer mechanisms of 
land use control ranging from zoning to comprehensive land use plans 
to historic district regulations to limitations on the ability of big box 
stores to abandon their property without providing for its sale, 
upkeep, or demolition, with many stops in between. 54 In addition to 
these methods, she also analyzes a variety of economic and social 
controls including econolT'jc impact reviews and private agreements 
between community groups and developers known as community 
benefits agreements. She notes that motive can be critical when a 
community restricts or restrains formula businesses and that 
regulation for the purpose of economic protectionism might be 
deemed an unlawful interference with out of state commerce under 
the dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine. 55 She concludes that careful 
planning and consensus building within a community can produce 
workable checks on formula businesses.56 
Professor Brannon Denning explores further the dormant 
Commerce Clause Doctrine's limits on the regulation of big box and 
other formula stores.57 He notes that, to date, the dormant Commerce 
54 Jd at Part II. 
55 !d. at Part III. 
56 Jd at 1287. 
57 Brannon P. Denning, Donnan! Commerce Clause Limits on the Regulation of Big 
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Clause claims have not fared well in challenges to local ordinances 
that restrict or effectively exclude big box and formula stores. He 
begins by critically examining the two most recent decisions 
involving dormant Commerce Clause challenges to such local 
ordinances: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Turlock?8 and Island Silver & 
Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada.59 
Professor Denning then ponders why dormant Commerce Clause 
claims have had so little success in challenges to local ordinances 
regulating big box stores and other formula businesses. He posits that 
one reason is simply the confusing signals that the Supreme Court has 
itself sent in this area. Consequently, federal judges find this area 
confusing and fail to understand that proof of protectionist purpose in 
and of itself is sufficient to invalidate a zoning ordinance, just as they 
fail to make appropriate use of evidence of discriminatory effects. 
More than mere confusion is at work, however. Drawing on recent 
work by Professor James Whitman that contrasts a "producerist" 
impulse in European law and a "consumerist" impulse in U.S. law, 
Professor Denning argues that deference to box store restrictive 
ordinances represents a producerist hold-over in the landscape of 
American law.60 Why then should such a sport survive dormant 
Commerce Clause challenges? Professor Denning hypothesizes that 
the difference between a more robust application of the dormant 
Commerce Clause to producerist legislation on the state level and a 
more deferential approach to local regulation may reflect judicial 
deference to local land use regulation and reluctance to second guess 
local interests. 61 
Finally, attorney Catherine LaCroix considers mechanisms by 
which states and local governments can help to mitigate the 
environmental impacts of big box and other formula businesses. 62 
Among these mechanisms are environmental impact statements (EIS) 
pursuant to the requirements of State Environmental Policy Acts 
(SEPAs). 
LaCroix examines the implementation of SEPAs in New York, 
Washington, and California and describes their potential power in 
reshaping the impact of formula businesses on local communities. 
Boxes and Chain Stores: An Update, 58 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1233 (2008). 
58 483 F.Supp. 2d 987 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 
59 475 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 
60 Denning, supra note 57, at Part III. 
61 !d. at 1249. 
62 Catherine J. LaCroix, SEPAs, Climate Change, and Corporate Responsibility: The 
Contribution of Local Government, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1289 (2008). 
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She notes that through the process of determining the environmental 
impact of siting and other decisions relating to businesses, state 
environmental agencies and local zoning and land use boards may be 
able to identify and mitigate environmental impacts that might not 
otherwise be regulated by federal or state environmentallaws.63 This 
may be particularly true regarding land uses that contribute to global 
climate change. She also argues that even in the absence of a SEP A 
local governments might be able to require an environmental impact 
inquiry pursuant to either their powers to regulate land use or their 
home rule power. Finally, she offers the hopeful expectation that state 
and local EIS requirements may foster greater corporate social 
responsibility. 64 
We have witnessed a series of dramatic and troubling events since 
the participants in this Symposium presented their papers. In the 
words of billionaire investor Warren Buffet, the economy bas '"fallen 
off a cliff. "'65 In the wake of this deep recession and the failure or 
near collapse of a number of prominent financial institutions, there is 
a growing distrust in the ability of loosely regulated or unregulated 
markets to self-correct. Further, in the face of growing economic 
distress, Americans, once again, appear to be taking a populist tum 
against what are often seen as irresponsible and greedy corporations. 
To date, that populist sentiment has focused primarily on issues of 
executive compensation, especially within corporations that have 
received federal financial bailouts. It is too soon to tell whether or not 
that sentiment will also result in a broader willingness to reconsider 
fundamental questions of corporate governance. The financial crisis 
and recession have, in tum, threatened the viability of numerous 
corporations. As a result, questions of what might local communities 
and the nation do, not only to retain but to sustain weakened 
corporations have come to the fore, again. 
63 I d. at Part II. 
64 I d. at Part III. 
65 Warren Buffett to CNBC: Economy Has "Fallen Off a Cliff," Posting of Alex Crippen 
to Warren Buffett Watch, http://www.cnbc.com/id/29592831 (Mar. 9, 2009) (quoting Warren 
Buffett's statement during an appearance on CNBC's Squawk Box); Jonathan Stempel, Buffet 
Says Economy Fell Off Cliff, REUTERS, Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
newsOne/idUSTRE5282J820090309. 
